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NOTE
Loss of United States Citizenship:
Fourteenth Amendment Limitations on
Congressionally Mandated Expatriation
Vance v. Terrazas
444 U.S. 252 (1980)
Laurence J. Terrazas, a citizen of both the United States and
Mexico at birth, obtained a certificate of Mexican citizenship upon
execution of a Mexican government form in which he both swore
allegiance to Mexico and expressly renounced his United States citi-
zenship.' Shortly thereafter, the Department of State issued a cer-
tificate of loss of nationality and, after a full hearing, the Board of
Appellate Review of the Department affirmed the conclusion that
Terrazas had voluntarily renounced his citizenship. I In an action for
a declaratory determination of Terrazas's nationality, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois concluded
that the government had proven, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that citizenship had been voluntarily relinquished pursuant
to § 34 9(a)(2 ) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. 3 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding
that for expatriation the fourteenth amendment requires the govern-
ment to prove by clear and convincing evidence that an individual
has relinquished voluntarily his citizenship.' On appeal, the Su-
preme Court, in a 5-4 decision, 5 held, reversed and remanded: (1) the
government must prove specific intent to surrender United States
citizenship and not simply the voluntary commission of an expatriat-
ing act; 6 (2) Congress, acting within its constitutional powers, is free
to prescribe a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof; 7 and
1. Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980).
2. Id. at 255.
3. Id. The relevant statutory language of § 439(a) of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(2) 1970 is set forth in the opinion. Id. at
254.
4. Terrazas v. Vance, 577 F.2d 7, 12 (7th Cir. 1978).
5. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Burger,
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist. justices Marshall and Stevens filed opinions con-
curring in part (with the first section of the majority opinion) and dissenting in part
(with the final two sections of the majority opinion). Justice Brennan filed a dissent-
ing opinion, in Part II of which Justice Stewart joined.
6. 444 U.S. at 263.
7. Id. at 266.
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(3) the rebuttable presumption that an act of expatriation was volun-
tary is not constitutionally infirm. 8 Vance u. Terrazas, 444 U.S, 252
(1980).
In Vance v. Terrazas the Supreme Court has reaffirmed,
clarified, and enlarged its position taken thirteen years earlier in the
landmark decision of Afroyim v. Rusk. 9 There, the Court asserted
that "Fourteenth Amendment citizenship was not to be shifted, can-
celed, or diluted at the will of the Federal Government, the States,
or any other governmental unit."10 Before discussing the impact of
Terrazas, however, it is necessary to review more carefully the fac-
tual setting. Following will be an examination of the relevant deci-
sions, including Afroyim, as reflections of the changing legal climate
leading up to the holding in Terrazas. This note will conclude with
an analysis of the Court's decision and the resultant implications for
the future.
I. THE FACTS OF VANCE V. TERRAZAS
Terrazas, the son of a Mexican citizen, was born in the United
States. In the fall of 1970, at the age of twenty-two and while a stu-
dent in Monterrey, Mexico, he executed an application for a certifi-
cate of Mexican nationality, swearing "'adherence, obedience, and
submission to the laws and authorities of the Mexican Republic" and
"expressly renounc[ing] United States citizenship, as well as any
submission, obedience, and loyalty to any foreign government, espe-
cially to that of the United States of America .. "11 The certificate,
issued in April of 1971, recited that Terrazas "has expressly re-
nounced all rights inherent to any other nationality, as well as all
submission, obedience, and loyalty to any foreign government, espe-
cially to those which have recognized him as their national." 12 The
8. Id. at 269-70.
9. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
10. Id. at 262.
11. 444 U.S. at 255-56 (citing to appendix of Brief for Appellant 5a). The applica-
tion contained the following statement: "I therefore hereby expressly renounce
___ citizenship, as well as any submission, obedience, and loyalty to any foreign
government, especially to that of __ , of which I might have been subject, all
protection foreign to the laws and authorities of Mexico, all rights which treaties or
international law grant to foreigners; and furthermore I swear adherence, obedience,
and submission to the laws and authorities of the Mexican Republic." Id. The blank
spaces in the statement were filled in with the words "Estados Unidos" (United
States) and "Norteamerica" (North America). Mexicans and other Latin Americans
commonly refer to the United States as "North America."
12. Id. (citing to appendix to Brief for Appellant 8a).
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Court noted that Terrazas had read and understood the certificate
upon receipt. 13
Later, following a discussion with an officer of the United States
Consulate in Monterrey, proceedings were instituted to determine
whether Terrazas had lost his United States citizenship by obtaining
the certificate of Mexican nationality. Although Terrazas denied that
he had relinquished his citizenship, in December 1971 the Depart-
ment of State nevertheless issued a certificate of loss of nationality.
After a full hearing in which the Board of Appellate Review of the
Department of State affirmed the Department's findings, Terrazas
brought suit, as permitted by § 360(a) of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act of 1952 (hereinafter Act),1 4 against the Secretary of State for
a declaration of his United States nationality. 15
The district court first examined § 349(a)(2) of the Act, which
provided that "a person who is a national of the United States
whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by ...
taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of
allegiance to a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof." 16 It
was also noted that the party claiming the loss of citizenship must
establish such claim by a preponderance of the evidence and that
there is a rebuttable presumption as to the voluntariness of the expa-
triating conduct.1 7 Thus, the court concluded, since the United
States had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Terrazas
had knowingly and voluntarily taken an oath of allegiance to Mexico,
he had, therefore, voluntarily relinquished his United States citizen-
ship. I
The court of appeals reversed, finding that in addition to proving
the taking of an oath to a foreign state, the government must estab-
lish, by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence, an intent to re-
nounce one's United States citizenship. "A clear, convincing and un-
equivocal evidence standard is the minimum burden of proof that can
satisfactorily guarantee that the individual's interest in the retention
13. Id.
14. 8 U.S.C, § 150 3 (a) (1970) provides that, "'If any person who is within the
United States claims a right or privilege as a national of the United States and is
denied such right or privilege by any department , , . upon the ground that he is not
a national of the United States, such person may institute an action . . .against the
head of such department . . . for a judgment declaring him to be a national of the
United States . . ."
15. 444 U.S. at 256.
16. 8 U.S.C. § 148 1(a)(2) (1970).
17. 8 U.S.C, § 148 1(c) (1970).
18. 444 U.S. at 256-7.
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of his citizenship is protected adequately." 19 The court thus rejected
the district court's assertion that "the declaration of allegiance to a
foreign state in conjunction with the renunciatory language of United
States citizenship 'would leave no room for ambiguity as to the intent
of the applicant.'" 20
II. THE HISTORICAL-LEGAL BACKGROUND:
CHANGING INTERPRETATION OF THE CITIZENSHIP
CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The doctrine of indelible allegiance, under which no person
could, of his own volition, terminate allegiance to the United States
without the consent of the government, was adhered to prior to the
Civil War.2 1 In 1868, however, Congress recognized that "the right
of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people, indispens-
able to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness." 
2 2
Perhaps of greatest importance in this early period was the
enactment of the fourteenth amendment. The first sentence of the
fourteenth amendment, which has become the most significant provi-
sion of the Constitution pertaining to citizenship, reads: "All persons
19. Terrazas v. Vance, 577 F.2d 7 (1978). The Court of Appeals, in prescribing a
clear and convincing standard of proof, may have been influenced by one important
fact which the Supreme Court failed to mefition in its subsequent decision. In his
application for registration, Terrazas drafted three separate statements. On one form,
he responded "no" to the questions: "Did you intend by this oath, or affirmation, to
abandon your allegiance to the United States, or transfer your allegiance to the
foreign state?" Id. at 9. In another statement, Terrazas acknowledged that he felt
"more Mexican than American," but nevertheless said that "by taking this oath I did
not consider that I was relinquishing my rights as an American citizen." Id. And in
yet another statement submitted that same day, he stated, contrary to his other two
statements, that he took the oath "with the intention of relinquishing my United
States citizenship." Id. Thus, as the Court of Appeals emphasized, there existed con-
siderable doubt as to Terrazas' true intent.
20. 444 U.S. at 257 (citing to the District Court's reliance on the language of
United States v. Matheson, 400 F. Supp. 1241, 1245 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd 532 F.2d
809 (2nd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
21. The classic statement of the doctrine of indelible allegiance is found in Shanks
v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 246 (1830).
22. Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223 (1868) (cited in, Schwartz, Ameri-
can Citizenship After Afroyim and Bellei: Continuing Controversy, 2 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 1003, 1004 (1974-75) (hereinafter referred to as Schwartz). A
foreshadowing of the 1868 Act is found in the language of the Act of March 3, 1865,
ch. 79, § 21, 13 Stat. 490, which provided that desertion from military service and
flight to avoid conscription were acts indicating the intention "to have voluntarily
relinquished and forfeited . . . rights of citizenship." Id. at 1004 n.6.
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born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside." 23  Clearly, this language suggests that it is not
within Congress' power to remove an individual's citizenship. Until
Afroyim v. Rusk, 2 4 however, the fourteenth amendment played no
significant role in the controversy over citizenship, for the citizenship
clause's absolute language was seen as incompatible with what courts
had come to view as compelling governmental interests necessitating
denationalization. 25
In the 1958 decision of Perez v. Brownell,2 6 the Supreme Court
heard the case of a natural born citizen who the government had
attempted to deport, pursuant to § 401 of the Nationality Act of
1940,27 on the grounds that he had voluntarily relinquished his citi-
zenship by remaining outside the United States to avoid service in
the military and by voting in political elections in Mexico. The fun-
damental issue before the Court was whether Congress could, consis-
tent with the fourteenth amendment, enact a law stripping an indi-
vidual of his American citizenship which he had never voluntarily re-
nounced. The Court rejected the contention that the citizenship
clause restricted the government's power to remove citizenship,
reasoning that Congress' implied power to deal with foreign affairs as
an indispensable attribute of sovereignty, coupled with the necessary
and proper clause, 2  empowers Congress to regulate voting by
American citizens in foreign elections; thus, involuntary expatriation
is within the scope of appropriate modes Congress can adopt to ef-
23. U.S. CoNsT., amend. XVI, § 1. The fourteenth amendment formally adopted
the jus soli method of determining citizenship. According to the theory of jus soli,
birth in the United States creates citizenship regardless of the parents' allegiance. See
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
24. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
25. The circumstances surrounding the enactment of the fourteenth amendment
also serve to explain its early insignificant role in the citizenship controversy. In the
landmark decision of Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), the
Supreme Court found that blacks were not citizens of the United States and that
Congress could not employ its apparently plenary power to alter their status as
aliens. Thus, in reaction to this decision and subsequent events leading up to and
through the Civil War, the fourteenth amendment was enacted, its chief purpose
being the protection of Black Americans. It was not until almost a century later that
the Supreme Court came to read the fourteenth amendment broadly.
26. 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
27. 54 Stat. 1137 (1940), as amended by the Act of September 27, 1944, 58 Stat.
74(b) (1944) § 401, was incorporated into § 349 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1481.
28. U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, el. 18.
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fecuate its general regulatory power . 2  The Perez majority specifi-
cally rejected the "notion that the power of Congress to terminate
citizenship depends upon the citizen's assent." 30
The significance of Perez may not, however, lie in the majority
holding. Of particular significance is Chief Justice Warren's dissent
objecting to the traditional American theory of congressional power
over citizenship. Citing in support the fourteenth amendment and
relevant language from the landmark decision of Osborn v. Bank of
the United States,31 Warren, speaking for himself and the three other
dissenters, contended that "whatever may be the scope of its powers
to regulate the conduct and affairs of all persons within its jurisdiction,
a government of the people cannot take away their citizenship simply
because . . . that government can be said to have a conceivably ra-
tional basis for wanting to do so."
'32
Warren's thought was echoed in the cases of Trop v. Dulles 33
and Nishikawa v. Dulles, 34 both decided on the same day as Perez.
Justice Brennan was the mobile member of the Court that day, voting
with the majority against Perez and then voting with the Perez dis-
senters to provide a majority against the government in Trop.
29. 356 U.S. at 57-60. The Perez court relied heavily on Mackenzie v. Hare, 239
U.S. 299 (1915), and Savorgan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 (1950). In MacKenzie,
the plaintiff, a native-born citizen and resident of the United States, married a sub-
ject of Great Britain and continued to reside with her husband in the United States.
The Court stripped her of her citizenship, citing as reasons the potential for embar-
rassment of the government, national complications, international policy, etc. 239
U.S. at 312. In Savorgan, the plaintiff, a native-born American citizen, voluntarily
obtained Italian citizenship while in the United States through naturalization in ac-
cordance with Italian law. She then lived in Italy with her Italian husband for a
period of four years before returning to the United States. The Supreme Court found
that she had thus expatriated herself. In neither MacKenzie nor Savorgan, the Perez
court noted, had either plaintiff intended to renounce American citizenship. 356
U.S. at 61.
30. Id. at 60.
31. 24 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). "[The naturalized citizen] becomes a member
of the society, possessing all the rights of a native citizen, and standing, in the view
of the Constitution, on the footing of a native. The Constitution does not authorize
Congress to enlarge or abridge those rights. The simple power of the national Legis-
lature, is to prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization, and the exercise of this power
exhausts it, so far as respects the individual.'" Id. at 827.
32. 356 U.S. at 65 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). It is important to note that the
Chief Justice did say, 356 U.S. at 66, that naturalization unlawfully procured can be
set aside. See, e.g., Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946); Baumgartner v.
United States, 322 U.S. 665 (1944); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118
(1943).
33. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
34. 356 U.S. 129 (1958).
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In Trop, the Court invalidated an attempt by the government to
expatriate a wartime deserter from the armed forces. 3 5  In
Nishikawa, the Court reviewed the case of a United States citizen
who, while temporarily in Japan, was drafted into the Japanese army.
Noting that expatriation had not occurred if the service had been in-
voluntary, the majority rejected the government's position that duress
was an affirmative defense and that Nishikawa had the burden of
overcoming the usual presumption of voluntariness.8
6
Nishikawa and Trop, taken together with Warren's strong dissent
in Perez, seemingly foreshadowed an impending change in the
law.3 7 In the landmark decision of Afroyim v. Rusk,38 later relied
upon by the Terrazas court, the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision
specifically overruled its decision made nine years earlier in Perez.
Because Afroyiin had such a strong impact on the Terrazas court's
decision, it is necessary to review the facts and holding of the case.
Afroyim, born in Poland, immigrated to America in 1912 and
became a naturalized United States citizen in 1926. Later, after mov-
ing to Israel in 1950, Afroyim voted in the 1951 election for the Is-
raeli Knesset, the legislative body of Israel.3 9 When Afroyim applied
for renewel of his United States passport, the Department of State
refused to grant it on the ground that he had surrendered his citizen-
ship by virtue of § 40 1(e) of the Nationality Act of 1940.40 In a de-
35. 356 U.S. 86. Justice Brennan agreed with the majority in Perez that there is
no constitutional infirmity in § 401(c) of the Nationality Act of 1940, which expatriates
the citizen who votes in a foreign political election. He concluded in Trop, however,
that § 401(g), which provides that a citizen shall lose his nationality by deserting the
military in the war, provided he is convicted by court martial, lies beyond the power
of Congress to enact. Conceding his apparently paradoxical position, Brennan went
on to distinguish the two cases. He argued that while § 401(e) is a means reasonably
calculated to insure avoidance of possible embarrassment to United States' foreign
relations, expatriation of the wartime deserter is not rationally related to Congress'
furtherance of the war effort. "I simply cannot accept a judgment that Congress is
free to adopt any measure at all to demonstrate its displeasure and exact its penalty
from the offender against its laws.'"
36. 356 U.S. at 135.
37. For an excellent discussion of the distinguishing factors in Trop, Perez, and
Nishikawa, and other relevant cases in the period 1958-1967, see Dionisopoulos, Af-
royim v. Rusk: The Evolution, Uncertainty and Implications of a Constitutional Prin-
ciple, 55 MINN. L. REV. 235 (1970); see also, Boudin, Involuntary Loss of American
Nationality, 73 HARsv. L. REV. 1510 (1960); and Goodtree, The Denationalization
Cases of 1958, 8 Am. U.L. REV. 87 (1959).
38. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
39. Id. at 254.
40. 54 Stat. 1168 (1940), as amended by 58 Stat. 746 (1946 ed.) [re-enacted as
§ 349(a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 267, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1481(a)(5)].
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claratory judgment action brought in federal district court alleging
that § 4 01(e) violated both the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment and section 1, clause one, of the fourteenth amendment, the
district court and the court of appeals held that Congress had the
constitutional authority to take away citizenship for voting in a foreign
country based on its implied power to regulate foreign affairs.
4 1
Emphasizing those cases decided with 4 2 and since 43 Perez in-
validating various other statutory sections providing for involuntary
expatriation, the Afroyim court rejected the idea expressed in Perez
"that, aside from the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has any
power, express or implied, to take away an American citizen's citizen-
ship without his assent." 4 The Court placed primary importance on
the citizenship clause, and, while noting that the clause was chiefly
designed to overrule Dred Scott, 5 found that it also places a restric-
tion on the government's power to take away citizenship.
We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to,
and does, protect every citizen of this nation against a congres-
sional forcible destruction of his citizenship .... Our holding does
no more than give to this citizen that which is his own, a constitu-
41. 387 U.S. at 225. Both Courts relied upon the holding in Perez.
42. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
43. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) and Schneider v. Rusk,
377 U.S. 163 (1964). In Mendoza-Martinez, the plaintiff was born in the United
States and thus acquired American citizenship by reason of jus soli. Because of his
parentage, however, he was also a Mexican citizen under Mexican law through jus
sanguinis. In this and a companion case, Rusk v. Cort, 372 U.S. 144, 149, the
Supreme Court was asked to nullify that section of the Nationality Act whereby
petitioners were found to have expatriated themselves by remaining outside the
United States to avoid military service. The Court found the pertinent section to be
void, "lacking .. . the procedural safeguards which the Constitution demands." 372
U.S. at 186. In Schneider, the Court held that § 352(a)(1) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, which provided that a nationalized citizen loses citizenship
by three years of continuous residence in the country of his origin, was violative of
due process under the fifth amendment of the Constitution, since no restrictions on
the length of foreign residence applied to native born citizens. 377 U.S. at 164-69.
For commentary on these and other cases decided in the period 1958-67, see Agata,
Involuntary Expatration and Schneider v. Rusk, 27 U. PiTT. L. REV. 1 (1965); Ap-
pleman, The Supreme Court on Expatriation: An Historical Review, 23 FED. B. J.
351 (1967); Gordon, Citizen and the State: The Power of Congress to Expatriate
American Citizens, 53 GEO. L.J. 315 (1965); Kramer, Restraints of Schneider v. Rusk
Upon the Foreign Policy Powers of the "Political Branches": How Meaningful Are
They?, 38 TEMP. L. Q. 279 (1965); Scharf, A Study of the Law of Expatriation, 38
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 251 (1964); Note, Involuntary Loss of Citizenship by Naturalized
Citizens Living Abroad, 49 CONELL L. Q. 52 (1963).
44. 387 U.S. at 257.
45. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). See note 25, supra.
NOTE
tional right to remain a citizen in a free country unless he voluntar-
ily relinquishes that citizenship."6
It is important to focus on Afroyirn as it relates to the specific
intent to relinquish one's citizenship. The Act of 1952 is based on the
notion of volition: after listing ten actions that may result in expatria-
tion, § 349(b) of the Act provides that "any person who commits or
performs any act specified in subsection (a) shall be conclusively pre-
sumed to have done so voluntarily and without having been subjected
to duress of any kind ...... 47 Thus, some sort of voluntary action
would seem to be all that Afroyim required. One commentator has
argued, however, that "in order to have any significance, Afroyim
must be read to hold that, although Congress can provide a
mechanism by which the individual can voluntarily expatriate himself,
volition is now a judicially ascertainable quality, and the government
must bear the burden of proving that the citizen's renunciation was
truly voluntary."
48
Although the Terrazas court did not mention the 1971 decision
of Rogers v. Bellei, 49 that case was significant in that it represented a
retreat from the principles set forth in Afroyim. Bellei was born in
Italy in 1939, the son of an American woman and her Italian husband.
Thus, Bellei was a United States citizen under the terms of a 1934
law providing that a child born outside the United States to an alien
and a citizen was himself a citizen. 50 However, upon pain of loss of
his nationality, Bellei was required to live continuously in the United
States for five years between the ages of fourteen and twenty-
46. Id. at 263.
47. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(e) (1970). The ten actions set forth in § 349 of the Act in-
clude service in a foreign army, taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign state, voting
in a foreign election, desertion from the armed services, treason against the United
States, obtaining naturalization in a foreign state, formal renunciation of citizenship in
the United States, formal renunciation abroad, performing a job or service in a
foreign state when the performer either has or acquires that state's nationality, and
leaving or remaining outside the United States during either a war or a national
emergency for the purpose of evading military service.
48. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1017-18. Thus, Schwartz argues, Afroyim makes
the statutory presumption of volition rebuttable rather than legally absolute. Id. For
other commentary on the Afroyim decision, see Duvall, Expatriation under United
States Law, Perez to Afroyim: The Search for a Philosophy of American Citizenship,
56 VA. L. REv. 408 (1970); Note, Acquisition of Foreign Citizenship: The Units of
Afroyim v. Rusk, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 624 (1969); Note, 'Voluntary Relinquishment"
of American Citizenship: A Proposed Definition, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 325 (1968).
49. 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
50. Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, 48 Stat. 797 (1954) (re-enacted as § 301(a)(7) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952).
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eight.5 ' The district court, 52 reviewing Bellei's challenge of the con-
stitutionality of § 301(b) of the Act of 1952,53 relied on Afroyim and
Schneider v. Rusk 11 in its decision to reinstate Bellei's citizenship.
The Supreme Court reversed in a 5-4 decision.
Emphasizing that Bellei's "claim to citizenship [was] wholly, and
only, statutory," 5 5 the Court concluded that "the first sentence of the
Fourteenth Amendment has no application to . . . Bellci. He simply
is not a Fourteenth Amendment first sentence citizen." 56  As in
Perez, the Court deferred to congressional power in the area of
foreign affairs, finding that § 301(b)
reveals a careful consideration by the Congress of the problems
attendant upon dual nationality of a person born abroad .... The
solution to the dual nationality dilemma provided by the Congress
by way of required residence surely is not unreasonable. It may
not be the best that could be devised, but here, too, we cannot say
that it is irrational or arbitrary or unfair. 57
Justice Black, author of the Court's majority opinion in Afroyim,
was the principal dissenter in Bellei. Rejecting the concept of a
hierarchy of citizenship as suggested by the majority, Black believed
that "Bellei, as a naturalized American, is entitled to all the rights
and privileges of American citizenship, including the right to keep his
51. 66 Stat. 236 (1952) (re-enacted as § 301(a) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952).
52. Bellei v. Rusk, 296 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1969). For a complete discussion
of the district court's holding, see Note, Citizen or Expatriate: A Question of Interest,
5 TFx. INT'L L.F. 284 (1970).
53. See, note 51 supra.
54. 377 U.S. 163 (1964). See discussion, note 43, supra.
55. Bellei, supra note 49, at 833.
56. Id. at 827. "His posture contrasts with that of Mr. Afroyim, who was
naturalized in the United States, and with that of Mrs. Schneider, whose citizenship
was derivative by her presence here and by her mother's naturalization here. The
plaintiff's claim must thus center in the statutory power of Congress and in the ap-
propriate exercise of that power within the restrictions of any pertinent Constitutional
provisions other than the Fourteenth Amendment's first sentence." See United States
v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), wherein the Supreme Court, reviewing early
English statutes relating to inheritance rights and of citizenship of persons born
abroad of parents who were British subjects, concluded that ~naturalization by des-
cent" was not a common law concept but was, rather, dependent upon statutory
enactment. Id. at 668-71. See also Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657 (1927).
"[B]irth within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Crown, and of the United States as
the successor of the Crown, fixed nationality, and .. . there could be no change in
this rule of law except by statute. Id. at 660.
57. Id. at 833.
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citizenship until he voluntarily renounces or relinquishes it."'5 8 For
Black, then, it was not the place where citizenship was conferred or
the residence of the citizen that was dispositive of the citizenship
clause's applicability; it was, rather, the act itself of conferring citizen-
ship.
5 9
III. VANCE V. TERRAZAS
REAFFIRMATION AND COMPROMISE
Apparently, the Supreme Court in Bellei was unwilling to accept
the major premise of Afroyim, i.e. that once granted, an individual's
citizenship is beyond any congressional power to divest, without that
individual's consent.6 0 Thus, Bellei raised questions concerning
Afroyim's continued relevance.
A. The Requirement of Intent
In Terrazas, the Secretary of State urged that the court of ap-
peals erred in holding that a specific intent to renounce American citi-
zenship must be proven before the taking of an oath of allegiance
could result in an individual's expatriation. His position was that the
government need prove only the voluntary commission of an act "that
is so inherently inconsistent with continued retention of American
citizenship that Congress may accord to it its natural consequences,
i.e. the loss of nationality." 61 Specifically, the Secretary argued that
Afroyin did not stand for the proposition that a specific intent to
renounce one's citizenship must be shown before that citizenship is
relinquished.62
58. Id. at 844. Black goes on to argue that "[Tihe Court today puts aside the
Fourteenth Amendment as a standard by which to measure congressional action with
respect to citizenship, and substitutes in its place the majority's own vague notions of
'fairness' . . . While I remain on the Court I shall continue to oppose the power of
judges . . . to change the Constitution from time to time according to their notions of
what is 'fair' and 'reasonable'. I would decide this case not by my views of what is
'arbitrary', or what is 'fair', but rather by what the Constitution demands." Id.
59. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1024. For additional commentary on Bellei and
related materials, see Bickel, Citizenship in the American Constitution, 15 Aluz. L.
REV. 369 (1973).
60. 401 U.S. at 835.
61. 444 U.S. at 259 (citing to Brief for Appellant 24).
62. Id. The Secretary further proposed that the dissent in Perez, and the majority
opinion in Afroyim, spoke only to conduct so contrary to undivided allegiance to the
United States that it could result in loss of one's citizenship without regard to intent
and therefore that "assent" should read as a 'code word' for intent to renounce. Id. at
260.
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The Court, however, read Afroyim differently. Pointing out the
language in Afroyim emphasizing that loss of nationality requires the
individual's "assent", 3 the Court felt it "difficult to understand that
Iassent' to loss of citizenship would mean anything less than an intent
to relinquish citizenship, whether the intent is expressed in words or
is found as a fair inference from proven conduct." 6 4 The Court con-
ceded that any of the expatriating acts specified in § 349(a) may be
highly persuasive evidence of a person's purpose in abandoning his
citizenship, but went on to say that the "trier of fact must in the end
conclude that the citizen ... intended to relinquish his citizen-
ship." 6 5
Chief Justice Warren's dissent in Perez seems to have greatly
influenced the Terrazas court's reasoning as to intent. Warren admit-
ted that under some circumstances an act such as voting in a foreign
election would undoubtedly have the effect of showing a voluntary
abandonment of citizenship. 66  He argued, however, that Congress
had employed a classification so overbroad that it encompassed con-
duct failing to show a voluntary abandonment of citizenship.6 7  In
support of his position he offered the example of a decision of a
former attorney general holding an American citizen to have lost her
citizenship by voting in a Canadian town election on the issue of
whether beer and wine should be sold. 6 8  Clearly, "voting in a
foreign election may be a most equivocal act, giving rise to no impli-
cation that allegiance has been compromised." 69 Warren maintained
that the particular facts of each case must be carefully scrutinized in order
to determine whether there had truly been the "embarrassment of
the government" that the Perez majority seemed so concerned about.
The Terrazas Court also gave considerable import to the lan-
guage of the Constitution. The intent of the fourteenth amendment,
63. Id. at 259-60 (citing Afroyiin, 387 U.S. at 257).
64. Id. at 260.
65. Id. at 261 (citing Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)).
66. 356 U.S. at 44 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). For example, abandonment of
one's citizenship could very well result if the individual desiring to vote in a foreign
election had to become a foreign national or represent himself to be one. Id.
Further, there might be circumstances where a United States citizen shown to have
voted at the behest of a foreign sovereign to advance its own territorial interests
would compromise his native allegiance. Id. at 76.
67. Id. at 76. Warren is arguing here that a statutory presumption cannot be
maintained if there exists no rational connection in common experience between the
fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed. He cites in support Manley v. Georgia,
279 U.S. 1, 7 (1928), Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943), Bailey v. Alabama,
219 U.S. 219 (1911).
68. Id. at 77 (citing In The Matter of F , 2 1. & N.Dec. 427).
69. Id.
NOTE
they noted, was to define citizenship. Thus, that definition could not
co-exist with a Congressional power to specify acts resulting in the
renunciation of citizenship absent an intent to renounce. "In the last
analysis, expatriation depends on the will of the citizen, rather than
on the will of Congress and its assessment of his conduct." 70  The
importance of the Court's findings as to intent appears immense. The
Court has, for the first time, clearly mandated that which was only
hinted at in Afroyim. In the future, the record must support a finding
that a particular expatriating act was accompanied by a specific intent
to terminate one's United States citizenship.
71
The Court seems to stop short, however, of returning to the ab-
solute standard set forth in Afroyim. First, though the factual setting
differs considerably from that in Terrazas, the Terrazas court makes
no mention of its decision in Rogers v. Bellei. 72 Bellei suggested that
the "Necessary and Proper" theory of denationalization, which, as was
noted, went virtually unchallenged until Afroyin, might be re-
emerging. 73 In spite of its frequent reference to Afroyiin's rhetoric
concerning the fourteenth amendment, the Terrazas court's silence
as to Bellei may imply a continuing hesitation in accepting Afrovim's
major premise. The question remains open as to whether the distinct
class of citizen suggested by Bellei still exists: a class to which the
"Fourteenth Amendment has no application . ,'
B. The Status of the 'Preponderance of the Evidence' Standard
Further evidence of the Court's reluctance to return to the abso-
lute standard of Afroyim is found in that portion of the opinion con-
cerning evidentiary standards. The court of appeals found Congress to
70. 444 U.S. at 260.
71. Id. at 263.
72. 401 U.S. 815 (1971). Brennan does refer briefly to Bellei in a footnote to Part
11 of his dissent. He simply notes that Bellei's citizenship was not based upon the
fourteenth amendment, and that the issue before the Court was whether Bellei could
lose his statutorily created citizenship for failure to satisfy a condition subsequently
contained in the same statute that accorded him citizenship. 444 U.S. at 270, (Bren-
nan, dissenting).
73. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1027. "In a subtle fashion, the Burger Court
reintroduced (in Bellei) for debate two important questions. The proposition that,
since Congress was under no Constitutional obligation to grant Bellei citizenship, the
citizenship thus conferred was only a 'watered-down' version of the citizenship pos-
sessed by those born in the United States, simply re-states the discredited right-
privilege dichotomy. The alternative is that the proper question is not whether Bellei
had a constitutional right to become an American citizen, but whether, as a citizen,
he had the same right to live abroad that all native-born citizens had." Id.
74. 401 U.S. at 827.
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be without constitutional authority to prescribe the standard of proof
in expatriation proceedings, and held that the proof in such cases
must be by clear and convincing evidence. Upholding the validity of
§ 349(c) of the Act which provided for a preponderance of the evi-
dence standard, the Supreme Court disagreed with the court of ap-
peals' conclusions.
To support its findings, the Court was forced to retreat from its
prior position taken in Nishikawa v. Dulles, 75 and thus justify the
standard subsequently set by Congress in § 349(c). Faced with the
loss of his United States citizenship under § 401(c) of the Nationality
Act of 1940, Nishikawa, a United States born citizen, contended that
the government was required to prove that his service during a tem-
porary visit to Japan was not involuntary. 76  Noting that Nishikawa
had been conscripted in a totalitarian state to whose conscription law,
with its severe penal sanctions, he was subject, the Court held that
the issue of voluntariness had been "adequately injected . . . (thus)
requiring the Government to sustain its burden of proving voluntary
conduct by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence."
77
In support of their belief that § 349(c) was, evidently, aimed to
supplant the evidentiary standard prescribed by Nishikawa, the Ter-
razas majority cited extensively to the Act of 1952's legislative his-
tory. The House Report accompanying § 349(c) stated that "in order
to forestall further erosion of the statute designed to preserve and
uphold the dignity and priceless value of U.S. citizenship .. .
§ 349(c) sets up rules of evidence under which the burden of proof to
establish loss of citizenship by a preponderance of the evidence would
rest upon the Government." 78  The Court emphasized further that
the Nishikawa ruling did not purport to be constitutional in nature,
79
75. 356 U.S. 129 (1958).
76. Id. at 132. The interesting facts of Nishikawa invite closer scrutiny. The
petitioner was born in California to Japanese parents. Upon graduation with a degree
in engineering from the University of California in 1939, he went to Japan. As re-
quired by the Japanese government, he took a physical examination, and in March of
1941 he was inducted into the Japanese army. The petitioner testified that Japanese
law provided for imprisonment for draft evasion, and that rumors he had heard about
the brutality of the Japanese secret police made him afraid to make any protest.
During the war, he served as a mechanic/maintenance man in a Japanese Air Force
regiment in China, Indo-China, the Philippines and Manchuria. The petitioner al-
leged that because of an opinion he expressed to a group of officers that there was no
chance of winning the war, he was frequently beaten. He even won the nickname
"America". Id.
77. Id. at 136-37.
78. 444 U.S. at 265 (citing to H.R. Rep. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 40, 41
(1961).
79. 356 U.S. at 130. "We need not in this case consider the constitutionality of
Section 401(c)." Id.
NOTE
though it did concede that the Nishikawa court had evinced a de-
cided preference for requiring clear and convincing evidence to prove
expatriation.
The Afroyim standard was also found to be not inconsistent with
the idea of Congress as being constitutionally devoid of power to im-
pose expatriation on an individual absent his assent. The Court
urged, however, that it does not follow that Congress is also without
power to prescribe the evidentiary standards governing expatriation
proceedings. 80 "[S]urely the [Afroyiml Court would have said so had
it intended to construe the Constitution to exclude expatriation pro-
ceedings from the traditional power of Congress to prescribe rules of
evidence and standards of proof in the federal courts."8 "
Justices Marshall and Stevens dissented from this portion of the
majority's holding. Marshall found the Court's discussion of congres-
sional power to prescribe standards of proof to be "the beginning, not
the end, of the inquiry." 8 2 It therefore remained the task of the
Court to determine whether those rules and standards impinged on
one's constitutional rights. Particularly troublesome to Marshall was
the Court's apparent reliance on the civil nature of expatriation pro-
ceedings; proceedings which the majority said "do not threaten a loss
of liberty." 8 3 This casual dismissal of United States citizenship, Mar-
shall urged, cannot withstand scrutiny, for "the mere fact that one
who has been expatriated is not locked up in a prison does not dis-
pose of the constitutional inquiry."
84
Clearly, the majority of the Court appears confused, for as Ste-
vens points out, "such reasoning construes the constitutional concept
of'liberty' too narrowly." 85 On the one hand the Court speaks of the
dignity and priceless value of American citizenship. Yet, many would
consider the loss of one's citizenship to be at least as regrettable as
the loss of 'liberty' resulting from criminal proceedings.
The answer seems to rest with the Court's desire to effect some
manner of compromise. The Court emphasizes the heavy burden
placed upon Congress by requiring the ultimate finding that an indi-
vidual has commited an act with the specific intent to renounce his
80. 444 U.S. at 265.
81. Id. at 266. The court noted that this power is rooted in article 1, § 8, cl. 9 of
the Constitution, creating the inferior federal court system. See, e.g., Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 31 (1976); Hawkins v. United States, 358
U.S. 74 (1958); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
82. 444 U.S. at 270 (Marshall, concurring in part, dissenting in part).
83. Id. at 266.
84. Id. at 270 (Marshall, concurring in part, dissenting in part).
85. id. at 272. (Stevens, concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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citizenship. Surely, then, "since Congress has the express power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, it is untenable to hold that it
has no power whatsoever to address itself to the manner or means by
which Fourteenth Amendment citizenship may be relinquished." 8 6
C. The Presumption of Voluntariness
Based upon its holding that neither the citizenship clause nor
Afroyim placed expatriation proceedings beyond the congressional
power to prescribe rules of evidence in federal courts, the majority
also concluded that the presumption of voluntariness provided for in
§ 349(c) is not constitutionally infirm. The Court points out an impor-
tant distinction that must be noted. While § 34 9 (c) provides that any
of the expatriating acts set forth in § 349(a) are presumed to have
been committed voluntarily, the section does not also require the
presumption that such act has been performed with the specific in-
tent to relinquish citizenship. That matter remains the burden of the
government to prove by a preponderance of the evidence.
8 7
Again the Court relied on the legislative history behind the
enactment, subsequent to Nishikawa, of § 34 9 (c): "[section] 349(c)
. . . makes clear that Congress preferred the ordinary rule that volun-
tariness is presumed and that duress is an affirmative defense to be
proved by the party asserting it." And neither Marshall nor Stevens
appear to find fault with this portion of the majority's holding.
Perhaps even they were willing to concede that Chief Justice War-
ren's conception of "actions in derogation of undivided allegiance to
this country . . . "8 would seem to contain an element of assent. Of
primary importance, however, was the Court's apparent willingness
to defer to Congress on matters seen to be within its competence.
The majority only hinted, in their conclusion as to the prepon-
derance of evidence standard, at their desire to effect some sort of
compromise with Congress. In discussing their decision concerning
the presumption of voluntariness, however, they leave little doubt as
to their intent. "To invalidate the rule here would be to disagree
86. Id. at 266.
87. Section 3 49(c) provides in relevant part that "any person who commits or
performs, or who has committed or performed, any act of expatriation under this
chapter or any other act shall be presumed to have done so voluntarily, but such
presumption may be rebutted upon a showing, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the act or acts committed or performed were not done voluntarily."
88. 444 U.S. at 261. Discussion of Chief Justice Warren's dissent in Perez v.
Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 69 (1958) implying that defendant's actions by their very
nature would entail the element of assent.
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flatly with Congress on the balance to be struck between the interest
in citizenship and the burden the Government must assume in dem-
onstrating expatriating conducts." 8 9
IV. CONCLUSION
In Afroyirn v. Rusk the Supreme Court declared that American
citizenship was an absolute right. The government of the United
States could not forcibly deprive an American of his nationality. Yet
Afroyim created complex questions and it remained to be seen
whether the Court could continue on the libertarian course it had set.
The decision in Terrazas does, clearly, indicate continued sup-
port for those principles espoused in Afroyin. The Court has even
enlarged upon Afroyim in holding the establishment of a specific in-
tent to relinquish one's citizenship to be an absolute requirement in
expatriation proceedings.
Further, the Court appears to have struck a fair balance between
the need to protect the ideals of the fourteenth amendment and con-
gressional power to prescribe rules of evidence and standards of proof
in the federal courts. True, the clear and convincing standard of
Nishikawa would better insure the protection of an individual's four-
teenth amendment rights. But, as stated previously, it would be "un-
tenable to hold that (Congress) has no power whatsoever to address
itself to the manner or means by which Fourteenth Amendment citi-
zenship may be relinquished." 90
The Terrazas decision is not without its troubling aspects. Of
particular concern is the Court's statement that "expatriation proceed-
ings ...do not threaten a loss of liberty." 9 1 Clearly, the Court is
inconsistent in its emphasis on the civil nature of expatriation pro-
ceedings. The loss of one's nationality may be of greater consequence
than punishment received in a criminal proceeding, for "citizenship,
like freedom of speech, press, and religion, occupies a preferred posi-
tion in our written Constitution, because it is a grant absolute in
terms." 9
2
The Court, however, is not unaware of the preferred position of
United States citizenship under the Constitution. Rather, the Vance
v. Terrazas decision reveals an attempt by the Court to balance the
rights conferred by the Constitution on its citizens with the interests
89. Id. at 269-70.
90. Id. at 266. The court agreed with Mr. Justice Black's concurring decision in
Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 139 (1958).
91. Id. at 266.
92. 356 U.S.. at 84 (Warren, C.J. dissenting).
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of the government. Indeed, the Court in Terrazas has, in its holding,
echoed the words of Chief Justice Warren written twenty-two years
ago: "One ... may be a good citizen or a poor one. Whether his
actions be criminal or charitable, he remains a citizen for better or for
worse, except and unless he voluntarily relinquishes that status.
While Congress can prescribe conditions for voluntary expatriation,
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